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ABSTRACT
Inthe most widely analyzed type of efficiency wage model of involuntary
unemployment, firms pay wages in excess of market clearing to give workers
an incentive not to shirk. Such payments in excess of market clearing and
the resultant equilibrium unemployment act as a worker discipline device.
This paper concerns what is usually considered the most important theoretical
criticism of such models: the so-called bonding argument. The essence of the
bonding critique is that contracts whereby workers pay a bond to the firm
upon taking a job (or pay an employment fee to gain employment) can elimi-
nate involuntary unemployment.Explicit upfront bonds are only quite rarely
observed. A more subtle form of the bonding critique argues that implicit
bonding through upward sloping wage profiles and other deferred payment
schemes can perfectly substitute for upfront bonds in providing incentives
not to shirk and thereby allow the labor market to clear.
This paper shows that upward sloping wage profiles do not act as a perfect
substitute for explicit bonds in a natural extension of the shirking model in
which workers are finite lived, the monitoring of worker behaviors on the job
is costly, and firms have reputations for honesty as employers.In the
absence of direct upfront bonding, optimal payment schedules will be in
excess of market clearing. The reason why upward sloping wage profiles that
are market clearing will not generally be the optimal labor contract is simple:
delayed payment may provide sufficient incentive to prevent shirking late in
the life of the contract, but in the beginning of the contract it does not
prevent shirking. And it turns out in a variety of stylized cases, it is
cheaper for the firm to pay a wage premium rather than to accept worker
shirking early in the contract. The implications of potential worker malfea-
sance in the absence of explicit bonds for compensation schedules, job assign-
ments, and firm monitoring strategies over the course of a worker's career
are also analyzed.
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Inthe most popular type of efficiency wage model of involuntary unemployment,
firms pay wages in excess of market clearing to give workers an incentive not to
shirk.1 Such payments in excess of market clearing and the resultantequilibrium
unemployment act as a worker discipline device.This paper concerns what is
usually considered the most important theoretical criticism of such models: the
so-called bonding argument.
Most efficiency wage models of the worker-discipline type explicitly assume con-
tracts where remuneration consists only of a constant wage. The wage is unable
to clear the labor market when it must simultaneously act both to allocate labor
and to provide incentives for adequate employee performance. However, more com-
plicated contracts whereby workers pay a bond to the firm upon taking a job (or
pay an employment fee to gain employment) could eliminate involuntary
unemployment.2 The threat of forfeiting the bond or paying a new employment fee
to acquire a job can generate work incentives allowing the wage to adjust so that
the total terms of the labor contract clear the labor market.
Below we shall present a model in which workers have a choice whether to work or
shirk, firms have reputations for honesty, and there are no net payments by
workers to firms. We shall explain in turn why each of these assumptions is na-
tural in view of empirical realities and recent work on efficiency wage theory
and the bonding problem.
11. Work-shirk:At least Siflce the movement sway from Taylorism, human resource
management and industrial relations specialists have emphasized the extent to
which workers are imperfectly controlled and monitored by their employers. We note
two recent exemplary studies which illustrate this point. The remarkable study
Cheats At Work by Mars (1982) shows the extent to which workers manage to cheat,
suggesting the importance of workers' discretion over their activities. Mars
documents a wide variety of workplace "fiddles" ranging from the practice of
supermarket checkout clerks of ringing up less than the proper amount and
pocketing the difference to the techniques developed by bus drivers to speed up
their journeys and gain longer breaks by picking up as few passengers as possible.
One dramatic but typical example concerns longshoremen in the port of St. John's,
Newfoundland.The dock gangs had systematic techniques for generating "acci-
dental" breakage in cargo so that it could be "legitimately" divertedpermitting
the stowers to pilfer the cargo shielded from the view of supervisors. Such an
incident is described in detail as follows:
The pilferage of thirteen of a consignment of a hundred men's suits provides
a good example of this unofficial history of events. The hatch-checker knew from
his bills of landing what sort of cargo was in transit.The vessel team then
engineered an 'accidental' fall of two crates.The damaged crates were moved
normally with the rest of the cargo to the shed. The shed team then engineered
the undisturbed pilferage of the suits.To do this the fork-lift truck driver
had to stack other cargo in such a way as to block off what was happening from
the superintendent's line of vision. At the same time, he constructed by skillful
stacking, a changing-room where suits could be tried on by the men. The next day
the hatch-checker reported that two crates were missing. By then the suits had
disappeared --smuggledout of the dock under the men's clothes. (Mars 1982; pp.
104-5).
Roy's (1952) study and later Burawoy's (1979) (coincidentally at the same
piecework machine shop) document in detail the ways in which workers via their
own individual initiatives and their social interactions manage to obtain autonomy
relative to management. The following example captures the flavor of
2worker-management relations in this plant. Eurawoy (citinE the Roy study) reports
an attempt by management in 1945-46 to prevent workers from signing onto a new
job before signing off their previous one.The workers were no longer allowed
to collect prints and fixtures for their new job before presentation of their
yellow cards signing off their old jobs. The initial response by workers to this
changed procedure was to steal into the crib for prints and fixtures. Management's
response of preventing all workers but the crib attendant to enter the crib slowed
output greatly and in consequence the new regulations were quickly rescinded.
The observation that workers are often only imperfectly monitored is incorporated
into our model by assuming that workers have a choice whether to work or shirk
and that the probability of being caught shirking is less than one. This as-
sumption is of course not new: it is at the heart of the unemployment as a worker
discipline device model.3
2. Firm reputation and honesty: If firms as well as workers are not honest, the
bonding argument may not be a valid reason why labor markets clear: if firms are
not trustworthy workers would be hesitant to post a bond and risk the chance that
dishonest firms will dismiss them and retain the bond. Stoft (1982) and more re-
cently MacLeod and Malcomson (1986) show that if firms are not trustworthy, wages
may be greater than market clearing and there will be equilibrium involuntary
unemployment.4 It is surely true that the opportunistic behavior modeled by these
authors is empirically observed and important; but we also believe that a great
deal of business is repeat business in which reputations can be easily established
and there is a return to honesty. If all firms were untrustworthy and as a con-
sequence had to pay more than the market clearing wage to attract workers, an
entrant with a reputation for honest treatment of workers would be able to attract
3labor at th'ir reservation price. Contracts would be of the form whe' workers
would initially post a bond to the firm and then collect a wage in excess of their
reservation wage. The value of the remuneration package would be just the reser-
vation price of the marginal worker. In this way because the honest firm pays
lower total remuneration (net of the bond posted by the worker)5, it makes higher
profits than the dishonest firms: there is a positive return to reputation. Thus
there is a theoretical argument for considering labor contracts between honest
firms and potentially shirking workers.
Our major concern with resting the case for efficiency wages on a model assuming
honest firms is empirical. It is our feeling that in most repeat business firms
do pay considerable attention to their reputation. Probably the most famous study
of this was made by Nacaulay (1963) whose study of business practices by 43 com-
panies in Wisconsin showed that these firms were in many respects willing to give
customers terms which were better than guaranteed by their legal contracts. Orders
could be canceled; adjustments were made for defective merchandise without ques-
tion, etc. In a more extraordinary example which is exactly germane to the labor
market Allen, Clark, and Sumner (1984) present evidence that many firms with no
legal obligation to do so have voluntarily paid retirees inflation adjustments
above those to which they were legally entitled. Such payments are almost cer-
tainly explained by firms' concerns with their reputations as fair employers.
Allen, Clark, and Sumner find that 75 percent of all beneficiaries in their sample
received at least one post-retirement increase in pension benefits between 1973
and 1979.
The recent work by Axeirod (1984) suggests a quasi-empirical reason why honesty
may dominate markets where there are repeat dealings and reputation may be im-
4portant.Axeirod Lnvit'd contestants to write programs to play a repeated
prisoner's dilemma game in a computer tournament. All entries played against each
other. "Nice" programs did overwhelmingly best, where "nice" programs are those
which are never the first to defect from a cooperative strategy. The clear-cut
winner of the tournament was the TIT FOR TAT strategy which starts with a coop-
erative strategy, and thereafter does what the other player did on the previous
move. The dramatic success of TIT FOR TAT in Axelrod's tournament suggests that
it pays firms to have reputations for honest behavior. The TIT FOR TAT program
won both rounds of Axelrod's tournament in large part because, of all the nice
programs, its behavior was the least ambiguous, and thus it most easily gained a
reputation for cooperative (but also retaliatory) behavior (Axelrod 1984, 20-21).
Axeirod's example of common implicitly understood mutual truces between soldiers
involved in trench warfare in World War I gives convincing empirical evidence of
the development of reputation and cooperation in circumstances where communi-
cation is difficult.
3. Absence of Explicit Bonding: The third property of our model concerns payments
by workers to firms. The model assumes that there are no net payments in any period
from workers to firms. Of course this contradicts the suggestion that optimal
contracts involve workers posting of bonds with the whole bond-cum wage profile
being at market clearing. But empirically net payments by workers to firms to
secure jobs seems very rare --infact sufficiently rare that the $250 to $1,000
recently paid upfront by flight attendant trainees to TWA for a training course
is newsworthy (San Francisco Chronicle March 17, 1986; p. 19).Because such
payments by workers to firms are so very rare the model of this paper will not
allow net payments by workers to firms. What we wish to see, as will be explained
5presently, is whether in the absence of explicit bonding whereby workers make
payments to firms more subtle forms of bonding will not take place.
It has been suggested that bonding need not occur by the explicit posting of a
bond at the start of a job, but instead by initial wage payments which are less
than workers' productivity and later wage payments in excess of workers' produc-
tivity. According to this folk argument, if this is the form of the payment
profiles workers in their early stages of their careers will not shirk because,
if caught, they must forfeit the high earnings of later years which are in excess
of their marginal product (and of their opportunity costs). It has been believed
that upward sloping wage profiles (such as described by Lazear (1979, 1981) to
explain mandatory retirement and hours constraints) will provide workers with an
incentive structure which will prevent shirking even in the absence of awage
profile whose overall present discounted value is greater than market clearing.6
This paper shows that the preceding conjecture is usually false in the most na-
tural framework of the shirking model.In the absence of upfront bonding (or
explicit employment fees), optimal payment schedules will be in excess of market
clearing.7 Thus the empirical absence of payments by workers to firmscannot be
explained by the substitution of implicit bonding (via upward sloping wage
files) for explicit bonding.The preceding sentence has been italicized (under-
scored) for emphasis because it represents the key point of this paper. We show
below with some generality that in the absence of explicit upfront bonding optimal
remuneration packages will have a value to workers in excess of their opportunity
costs. The presumption cannot be made that real world contracts are fully bonded
unless explicit upfront bonds are directly observed.On the contrary, as our
examples seem to document, in the absence of upfront bonds, in situations where
6shirking and imperfect monitoring are importcnt, the presumption should be made
that compensation packages are in excess of market clearing.
II. EXPLANATIONOF THE MODEL AND PLAN OF THE PAPER
Thereason why upward sloping wage profiles that are market clearing will not
generally be the optimal labor contract is simple: delayed payment may provide
sufficient incentive to prevent shirking late in the life of the contract, but
in the beginning of the contract it does not prevent shirking. And it turns out
in a variety of stylized cases, it is cheaper for the firm to pay a wage premium
rather than to accept worker shirking early in the contract.
A. The Trust Fund Concept
Why is there shirking at the beginning of a market clearing contract? View the
firm as setting aside a trust fund of unpaid wages for the individual worker in
the case of an upward sloping (but market clearing) wage profile. The worker who
decides to shirk is risking giving up the trust fund. In a continuous time set-
ting, suppose that a worker who shirks for a short time dt will be caught and lose
his trust fund with probability p dt. The expected loss from shirking for a risk
neutral worker at time T
p dt Jx(t)eTt) dt
where x(t) is the unpaid portion of wages and r is the interest rate. The po-
tential gain from shirking during this interval is v dt. Thus, it takes some time
7before the trust fund from unpaid wages (and accrued interest) is sufficient to
prevent shirking.
We have thus seen the flaw in the basic folk theorem that upward sloping wage
profiles in the absence of explicit upfront bonding, will act as an incentive
against shirking, with market clearing wage profiles. This argument explains why
workers may not shirk late in their careers; it fails to explain why workers will
not shirk early in their careers, as will in fact occur with market clearing
wages.8 It remains, however, to show that paying a premium above marketclearing
wages will be a cheaper way to hire effective labor units than paying market
clearing wage levels with workers shirking early in their careers. Such a pro-
position is not true in general. But we will show that with a rather wide variety
of productivity patterns, the cost of shirking by workers early in their careers
with market clearing wage schedules will be greater than the cost of paying wage
premiums in excess of market clearing which prevent workers from shirking en-
tirely.
B. Plan of Paper
The paper proceeds in several easy steps. The next section will present a simple
natural model to analyze the basic problem with the folk argument that deferred
payment schemes allow the labor market to clear in the presence of a worker moral
hazard problem.Firms have reputations for honesty and do not cheat on their
potential wage promises. Workers have an opportunity to shirk. If workers shirk,
they have a probability p dt of being caught in the short interval dt, during which
time their shirking will yield them utility in the amount v dt. Workers' pro-
ductivity is constant at e over the period if working, and is 0 if shirking. Their
wage working in the secondary sector (in which there is no shirking problem) is
8w' (indpendent of their age). The model up to this point correspondsexactly
to a continuous time analogue of the Becker and Stigler (1974) model except that
we add one more constraint: by assumption there is no upfront bond -presumably
because workers face a capital market constraint and cannot borrow to post such
a bond.In section III, the model is presented with constant w*, constant e*,
and no discounting. The essence of the argument is highlighted in this stripped
down version of the model.
In section IV, we deal with several complications to the model: will the optimal
contract still be nonmarket clearing if there is discounting? if w(t) varies
over time? if eC(t) varies? The answer is not always yes. It turns out that if
eC(t) rises (as seems natural) relative to w(t), then the market clearing con-
tract may sometimes be optimal.
At first glance a rising e(t) relative to w(t) may seem realistic. Workers in
the primary sector are likely to acquire firm specific knowledge and human capital
with work experience.Yet, workers may not simply gain specific human capital
automatically through being on the job regardless of their work efforts. An al-
ternative model in this spirit is suggested: e*(t) does not rise exogenously, it
only rises if the worker is not shirking. In other words, e*(t) is a function of
time actually worked, not just time on the job. In this case, it turns out that
nonmarket clearing contracts are optimal. Such models are presented in section
V.
Sections III, IV, and V all deal with models in which workers and firms have the
same discount rate. Although it is possible in such models to show that optimal
labor contracts are not market clearing, there are still many wage profiles of
9equivalent present di:;counted value for which the firm and worker are indifferent.
Introduction of a bit of myopia on the part of workers in terms of a slightly
higher discount rate gives a determinate solution to the path of remuneration.
Models with worker myopia are analyzed in section VI.
The systematic life cycle pattern of the incentives to shirk under deferred pay-
ment schemes calls into question the assumption that workers will be monitored
in such a way that the probability of being caught shirking is constant over the
course of their careers. The implications of allowing monitoring decisions to
be endogenous are analyzed in section VII. The optimal monitoring strategy in-
volves intensive monitoring early in a worker's career and less intense monitoring
as the worker gains experience with the firm and builds up a larger trust fund.
The optimal contract still involves an efficiency wage premium when monitoring
is allowed to vary under a monitoring technology in which the likelihood of de-
tecting worker malfeasance is proportional to monitoring expenditures.
III. BASIC MODEL
This section constructs a natural simple model to illustrate why labor markets
fail to clear in the absence of employment fees even in markets where firms are
trustworthy.In this model, workers have discretion over their own effort and
firms have imperfect abilities to monitor shirking.After a firm observes a
worker shirking, any consequent dismissal of the worker for that violation is
assumed to be immediate.9 In this environment, different compensation profiles
10have different costs to the firm and also different incentives to workers. The
properties of compensation profiles with the best trade off between cost and work
incentives (from the firm's point of view) will be examined.
A. The Model's Assumptions
The following assumptions fully describe the model. Asterisks denote where mod-
ifications will be later discussed.
Time
1. A worker has a work career beginning at time 0 and ending at time n.
2. Time is continuous in the model.
The Work-Shirk Decision and its Consequences
3. At each point of his career, the worker has a decision whether to work or
to shirk. The worker makes this decision at each point of time to maximize ex-
pected lifetime utility.
4. A worker who shirks will supply 0 units of effective labor to the firm. A
worker who works will supply e units of effective labor to the firm)0
5. e is constant throughout the worker's career.
6. The monetary value of shirking to the worker for the short length of time
dt is v dt.
The Monitoring Process and Worker Discipline! Firm Honesty in
Dismissal
7. A worker who shirks for the period dt is detected by the firm withproba-
bility p dt.
8. A delay cannot occur between observation of shirking and a worker's conse-
quent dismissal.
9. Firms are totally honest in their dismissals. Workers are never dismissed
unless caught shirking.
Alternative Opportunities for Workers
10. A worker has outside opportunities which pay a wage w"(t), for It
is convenient to think of these alternative opportunities as the secondary labor
market.
11w(t)is constant throughout the worker's career at w'.
12. Upon leaving the firm at t,theworker can immediately earn w(t).
11Workers' and Firms' Utilities and Discount Fates
13. Both firms and workers are risk neutral.
14. Both workers and firms have a zero rate of discount.
15. Workers are homogeneous.
Restriction on Compensation Schedules
16. Workers do not pay firms an explicit bond upon joining the firm. In other
words, there are no net payments by workers to firms.
B. Brief Comparison of the Model with the Shapiro-Stiglitz Model of Unemployment
As a Worker Discipline Device and Lazear's Model of Mandatory Retirement
The major innovation in our model over that of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) occurs
in the explicit modelling of the workers career path of wages within the firm.
Shapiro and Stiglitz assume infinitely lived workers and implicitly assume the
compensation path, w(t), is constant. Our model may appear different from that
of Shapiro and Stiglitz because it is assumed that the outside wage w*(t) is in-
stantaneously available to a worker who is caught shirking and consequently dis-
missed. Such an appearance of difference, however, is superficial. In the context
of Shapiro and Stiglitz, the present discounted value of w*(t) between t and n
can be interpreted as the monetary value of the expected discounted stream of
earnings and leisure of a worker between the date of his dismissal and his re-
tirement.It has been widely conjectured that explicit modelling of workers'
career compensation paths will show that labor markets clear in the
Shapiro-Stiglitz model because upward sloping wage profiles provide incentives
not to shirk since dismissal results in loss of future earnings in excess of
workers' alternative opportunities.
Finally, we wish to note that our model deals explicitly with the issue analyzed
by Lazear (1979, 1981) of the design of an optimal wage profile as an agency
12roblem. There are many differences between Lazear's model nd our own, but none
of them are fundamental. In Lazear's model, an employee has a chance to takean
amount 8 at any time t. That person will be caught with certainty in the next
instant. Lazear then asks what the market wage contract will be given potential
moral hazard on both sides of the market, on the side of the worker whomay shirk
and of the firm which may fail to make its payments. There are three differences
between Lazear's model and our own. The malfeasance of the worker has a payoff
which is not a lump sum 8 but is proportional to the length of time the worker
shirks. The probability of a worker being caught for committing malfeasance isp
dt, not equal to 1 in the short period of time dt. And, it is assumed that the
firm will not cheat on its implicit contract to the worker. Apparently, none of
these differences between Lazear's model and our own is fundamental, at least in
one important respect: both models predict a wage package with a present dis-
counted value that exceeds the present discounted value of the alternativewage
offer w(t) in the absence of explicit employment fees paid at the time the
workers begin their jobs.
C. Derivation of the Optimal Wage Path
The firm in this model wishes to purchase labor efficiency units at minimum unit
cost. We shall show that the cost minimizing wage package involves total payments
whose sum is wn + v/p. The alternative opportunities (which are freely available
to a worker) pay a lifetime total of wn. Thus, total remuneration from the cost
minimizing package is in excess of the total remuneration in the secondary labor
market by v/p.
13It is intuiti'e that the firm will lose nothing by paying all of the v-rker's
remuneration at the worker's retirement date. This way the firm's expenditure on
worker remuneration will do the most work in inducing workers not to shirk. At
each point in his career, the worker has the inducement not to shirk of the payment
at the end of his career which is only received if he is never caught shirking.
Given that we need only consider compensation schemes in which all payments are
made at the end of the worker's career, it is only necessary to discover theop-
timal total remuneration over the worker's lifetime. The worker must be paid at
least w*nat theend of his career in order to be induced to join the firm.
Suppose that the worker is paid wn +x.What is the optimum value of the premium
paid to the worker abve the market-clearing wage stream whose lifetime value is
nw*? In other words, what is the optimal choice of x?
Given that the firm is paying the worker wn+x at the end, we can view the worker's
choice problem in the following way. Suppose a worker has not previously been
caught shirking at time t.Theworker faces the following choice at t.Hemay
choose to shirk over the interval ttot+dt. This policy has the gain v dt due
to the added utility from shirking. However, if the worker gets caught shirking,
his total compensation will be w(n-t) from future earnings in the secondary
sector rather than the wn+x available at his firm for someone never caught
shirking.Consequently, if the worker plans to work from time t+dt to n, his
potential gain from shirking is v dt, and his potential loss is
p dt((w*n+x) -w(n-t))
whichsimplifies top dt(wt+x).H At the point Twhere the worker is just at the
margin between working and shirking, we have
14(1) p dt(wTf-x) =vdt.
At later times, it will be more costly for the worker to be caught shirking, and
therefore the worker will work. And at earlier times it is less costly to be
caught shirking and therefore the worker will shirk.
As described above, equation (1) suggests the simple analogy of the trust fund
which underlies much of the logic of our argument. We can pretend that the firm
sets up a trust fund for its workers.It puts up x in the beginning when the
worker is initially hired and later puts money into the trust fund at rate w*.
At each point in time t, the worker must decide whether to shirk, with the ill
consequence that he may be caught with probability p dt and give up the accumu-
lated trust fund of amount wt+x. The potential gain from shirking is v dt.
Consequently the worker is just indifferent between working and shirking at time
T for which x
(2) p dt [wT + x} =vdt.
What is the optimal value of x given that T obeys (2)? Equation (2) yields the
value of T for each x,
x
(3) T min((v/p -x)/w*,0).
The firm's problem is to choose x to minimize unit labor costs which are given
by
(4) wn +x wnx
(n_Tx)e* (n-[( -x)/w*])e*
15over the range It is easily sl'own that expression (4) is minimized if
x=v/p, over the range since the derivative of (4) with respect to x is
negative for all x in the range
As a result, the optimal (cost minimizing) wage package will pay a premium x=v/p.
This implies T=O. There is never any shirking under the optimal compensation
profile and the firm makes total career payments of v/p in excess of the market.
An explanation for this solution proceeds as follows. For a worker ever to work,
at the last instant worked he or she must receive a surplus of at least v/p. This
v/p constitutes a fixed cost to the firm. At all previous moments worked, the
worker must also have a surplus of at least yip, so that the firmpays a minimum
to the worker of w"t+v/p for working a length of time t. By paying w*n+v/p at
the end of the worker's career, the firms spreads the fixed cost v/p over the
maximum working time (the worker's whole career n) and therefore unit labor cost
12 is minimized.
It has been seen that in the case without discounting that a firm which minimizes
its unit labor costs in the presence of a shirking problem and without the ability
to collect upfront employment fees from workers must pay a careerwage that ex-
ceeds the alternative career earnings available to workers in the secondary sector
by v/p. Upward sloping wage profiles cannot fully substitute for explicit em-
ployment fees in such a model. Only after the trust fund has an accumulated value
v/p will the worker stop shirking. And if "bonding" occurs by workers' initial
receipt of wages below the secondary sector level, it takes too long for the
worker to stop shirking if total lifetime wages paid out are at the market
clearing level.It is better instead for the firm to pay an efficiencywage
16premium of v/p in excess of market clearing at the en of the worker's career and
prevent shirking altogether. Upward sloping wage profiles alone do not eliminate
the need for efficiency wage payments when worker behavior can only be imperfectly
monitored.
Remark:
The model above has only one type of job for workers in the primary sector. If
jobs differ according to the ease of monitoring, a firm's optimal strategy is to
assign younger workers (recent hires) to more easily monitored jobs. Indeed, if
there are enough productive jobs with costless monitoring, the equilibrium con-
tract will be market clearing with workers placed in jobs with no shirkingpo-
tential early in their careers and moved to more responsible jobs once their trust
funds have built up sufficiently. Furthermore, if primary sector firms are paying
above market clearing wages because of monitoring difficulties, there is an in-
centive for primary sector firms to merge with secondary sector firms. In this
case, workers would be positioned in the secondary sector jobs early in their
careers and optimal deferred payment schemes could potentially be market clearing.
The importance of job specific human capital accumulation may limit the usefulness
of such measures.
IV. SOME EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL
The last section demonstrated the fundamental proposition that workers who decide
to work rather than to shirk weigh the costs versus the benefits of shirking: the
17costs of shirking come from the probability p dt of being caght rind forfeiting
a trust fund of earned wages which would be paid at a later date if the worker
were still an employee in good standing; the benefit of shirking is v dt. Only
if the trust fund is larger than v/p will it pay to work rather than shirk.
In the absence of an employment fee (which would be the worker's contribution to
the trust fund at the beginning of his employment) or the firm's paying a premium
(which would be the firm's initial contribution to the trust fund), it takes some
time for the trust fund to build up to the point that the accrued unpaid wages
exceed v/p. The amount of time required depends positively on the value of
shirking to the worker and negatively on the likelihood that a shirking worker
is detected by the firm. In the preceding example with e* constant, w* constant,
and no discounting by either firms or workers, we showed that with no employment
fees possible the firm minimized the cost of a unit of effective labor by paying
into the trust fund v/p at the beginning of the worker's career and letting wages
accrue at the market clearing wage rate as long as the worker continued with the
firm. In this case, the worker always loses at least v/p if caught shirking and
thereby chooses never to shirk. With no discounting and a constant path of w
and e that such a policy was cheaper than paying a lower career wage bill, in
which case workers would shirk early in their careers. With lower total wage
payments (i.e. x less than vip), workers would shirk for a long enough period that
although total wage payments would be lower, the costs per effective labor unit
would be higher than when paying a premium of v/p.
A natural question presents itself: to what extent does this result of optimal
wages in excess of market clearing generalize. If there is discounting at rate
r? If w' and e vary over a worker's career?
18This section will show several ways in which the preceding proposition general-
izes. It generalizes if there is discounting at a constant rate r, but with e
and w constant. The basic proposition holds both with and without discounting
if e(t) and w*(t) vary over time but e(t)/w(t) is a constant. With general
paths for w(t) and e(t) the firm may not pay wages in excess of market clearing.
In particular, if e(t) is increasing rapidly relative to w(t) it will not pay
the firm to pay wages in excess of market clearing for a simple reason. If e(t)
is low in the beginning relative to w(t), the trust fund is building up rapidly
relative to the amount of effective labor power the firm is losing by the worker's
shirking early in his career. The firm could contribute a premium v/p and prevent
shirking in the worker's early years. But, if the worker's productivity in the
early years is low why should it bother?
A. Constant w(t), Constant e(t), and Discounting
In this subsection, we redo the analysis of section III allowing for positive
discount rates by firms and workers to determine whether firms will choose to pay
a present discounted value of career wages in excess of market clearing. The case
of a constant outside wage w, a constant worker efficiency e*, and a constant
discount rate r>O shared by both firms and workers is examined.As before, we
assume that the firm will pay all the remuneration in the last period. A later
section (section VI) examines the case of worker "myopia", where workers have a
higher discount rate than firms: in that case only the premium v/p is paid in the
last instant.
r(n-t) rn Suppose that the firm pays we dt + (v/p)ein the last period. Then the
0
value of the trust fund is always in excess of v/p, and the worker will never
19shirk.Nothing stops us from comparing this strategy of compensation to what
would occur if the firm paid all compensation at retirement, but paid no premium
in excess of market clearing. In that case the worker would shirk up to some date
T (T>O) but not beyond. The firm would pay wages whose expected value at time 0
is
(5) wert dt















then we have shown that the payment of the premium v/p e" at time n results in
cheaper labor than the payment of no premium. The LHS of (7) is the discounted
cost of labor per discounted unit of effective labor with payment of the premium.
The RHS of (7) is the discounted cost per unit of discounted labor in the absence
of any premium.Although establishment of this equality does not show that the
payment of this particular premium is the optimum, it does establish that the
payment of some premium must be better than the payment of no premium at all.
As we demonstrate in Appendix 1, simple algebraic manipulation of (7) and utili-
zation of the marginal work-shirk condition suffice to show that in fact (7) is
true for all r.A slightly more subtle calculation shows that in fact payment
of the premium v/p ert at date n, a policy which totally prevents shirking, is
20not only better than payment of no pr"mium, it is in fact the optimum remuneration
scheme for the firm in this setting.
B. Further Results
The preceding methods can be generalized to consider specific special cases, whose
results we shall summarize here. In each case an inequality analogous to (7) is
examined to see whether payments of a premium v/p results in lower labor costs
than market clearing wage packages.The effective labor cost for the market
clearing wage is calculated using a marginal work-shirk condition.
In the following cases, it is always true that payment in excess if market
clearing wages results in less costly labor.
1. e(t) is proportional to w(t) and there is no discounting.
2. e(t) is proportional to w*(t), there is discounting, and both e*(t) and
w(t) are declining.
3. e(t) is proportional to w(t) but rising and the discount rate is suffi-
ciently small.
If e(t) is proportional to w(t) and there is discounting, it is not in general
true that payment of a premium with discounted value at the start of the job of
v/p is better than paying a market clearing remuneration package.
Furthermore, if the ratio of e'(t) to w(t) is rising, it is not always true that
payments equal to the present value of the market clearing wage yield higher costs
per effective labor unit than do contracts that pay a wage premium. Payment of
the market clearing wage means that workers shirk until time T, but if workers
are not very productive in primary sector firms early in their careers (relative
21to their outside wages in the secondary sector), the firm does not lose much by
not paying a premium.In the limiting case of e(t)O up until the marginal
work-shirk time T, the firm has nothing to lose by workers' potential shirking
in this interval, and there is no reason to pay wages above the market clearing
level. The firms whose behavior we are modelling are high wage primary sector
employers where long job tenures are prevalent and incentives for investment in
skills are high.Presumably in such primary sector firms productivity grows
faster than in secondary sector firms where jobs tend to be more freely available
and job durations tend to be short. The finding that market clearing wages may
be optimal if eC(t) rises relative to w(t) indicates that the use of efficiency
wage premiums to prevent shirking may not be a wise strategy for firms in the
empirical reality we wish to model. This motivates the next section.
V.ENDOGENOUS LEARNING
Theprevious section showed that in the appealing case where e'(t) rises relative
to w(t) market clearing compensation packages might be optimal for primary sector
employers. The attractiveness of these market clearing contracts with concomitant
shirking early in a worker's career depends crucially on the growth of e"(t) not
being adversely affected by this shirking behavior.It seems plausible that
worker shirking will adversely affect on-the-job productivity growth.Some of
the benefits of training and learning-by-doing may not arise exogenously but de-
pend on workers paying attention to their jobs rather than shirking.In this
section, we take these factors into account by assuming that e*(t) only grows in
22perods during which the worker is actually working and does nc:: rise during pe-
riods of shirking so that the worker malfeasance harms future productivity as well
as current performance. When the rise in e*(t) relative to w(t) depends on the
time actually worked in the primary sector, nonmarket clearing payment schemes
which provide enough of a premium to prevent shirking early in a worker's tenure
are optimal. Shirking early in a worker's career is quite costly to a firm when
on-the-job productivity growth is adversely affected by shirking even if the
worker is not very productive during his or her early tenure. This result arises
since early shirking reduces the effective labor units supplied by the worker in
the primary sector later in his or her career.
A simple modification of our basic model that highlights the optimality of awage
package utilizing an efficiency wage premium in this case begins with the as-
sumption that the effective labor supplied by a worker in a primary sector job
grows exponentially at rate during time actually worked but does not grow during
periods of shirking. This implies
(8) e(t) =etwhere t=max(t-T,0),
>O, and T equals the date at which the worker's trust fund has accumulated to
the point at which the worker is indifferent between working and shirking. We
assume w(t) is constant at w and initially assume no discounting. It is suf-
ficient to show that the nonmarket clearing package that offers the premium v/p
and thereby prevents all shirking leads to lower costs per effective labor unit
than the market clearing package. We shall briefly describe the calculation which
needs to be made to establish this point.The method parallels that used in
previous sections.
23The market c1earng contract leads to shirking up to date T at which the vlue
of the trust fund (jwcdt) times the probability of being caught shirking (p dt)
0
justequals the gains from shirking:
(9) pdtwdt=vdt.
Jo
The package involving a premium v/p is cheaper than the market clearing contract
if
nw nw +v/p
(10) edt e dt
Jo
The numerator of the LHS is wage payments in the market clearing contract, and
the denominator is the efficiency units of labor supplied by a worker who opti-
mally decides to supply effort from T to n under this contract.The RHS
analogously gives unit labor costs under a contract paying the premium v/p.
Evaluation of the integrals in (10) and some algebraic manipulation suffice to
show that (10) implies the inequality
(11) (e-l)2 >
whichis true.13 A contract involving a premium sufficient to prevent all shirking
dominates a market clearing package when e(t) grows exponentially relative to
w with time actually worked. This result also follows when firms and workers
have a common positive discount rate. The proof in the discounting case involves
considerable calculation and therefore is presented in Appendix 2.
24VI. MYOPIC WORKERS
The previous solutions for optimal remuneration schedules have been derived under
the assumptions that firms and workers share the same rate of discount and also
are risk neutral. Because of those two assumptions, only loose restrictions are
placed on the timing of payments (although the total discounted value of payments
is determined). The assumption that workers have a higher rate of discount than
firms (or, alternatively, have a concave utility function dependent on the current
wage) will explicitly determine the wage path and thus eliminate the unrealistic
feature of our previous payment schedules that all wages are paid at the date of
retirement.
We assume as before that the outside wage w and inside labor efficiency units
e are constant, as also are the flow return from shirking v, and the instanta-
neous probability of being caught p. The innovation in this section will be to
assume that firms discount future payments at the rate r, while workers discount
future payments at the rate 5, and with 5>r since workers on average have poorer
access to capital markets than firms.
A. Optimal Remuneration Schedule
The optimal remuneration schedule has the following form when workers have a
higher discount rate than firms. A worker at the end of his or her career receives
a premium v/p. In every period prior to that the worker receives w +6(v/p).
The preceding solution to the optimal contract can be motivated by backward in-
duction (following the logic of Becker and Stigler (1974)). To get the worker
25to work in the final instant, a premium of v/p must be paid. This premium is a
fixed cost borne by the firm: the worker must have a premium of v/p in the last
period (instant) worked. Now assume the worker is paid at rate w* + ó(v/p) between
time t and time n. These payments are just at the minimum level so that the worker
at each instant has a surplus of v/p if employed, and therefore chooses to work
rather than shirk. Then ask the question how much the worker must be paid to work
rather than shirk from t-dt to t. This could be done by a payment
(w' + 6 (v/p)) dt
between t-dt and t. The firm could also make higher payments at a later date and
reduce the payment between t-dt and t. Yet, these higher futurepayments would
have to be more expensive to the firm, whose discount rate r is lower than the
worker's discount rate 6.Thus the optimal schedule to keep the worker form
shirking is to pay at a rate w + 5(v/p) from 0 to n. Appendix 3 shows rigorously
that the minimum cost contract to keep the worker working from 0 to n is topay
a constant wage w + 6(v/p) plus a final payment v/p at the retirement date.
It is also true that it pays the firm to induce the worker not to shirkthroughout
the worker's whole career. A payment v/p represents a fixed cost to create work
incentives for a given worker.In the worker's last instant of working, there
must be a surplus of at least v/p. If this surplus is at its minimum,wages paid
discounted at rate r must be minimized by paying at w* + ô(v/p) for the worker's
whole career. The firm receives the lowest possible labor cost if itspreads the
fixed cost v/p over the longest possible working career.Thus the optimum
remuneration schedule is to pay at the rate w + ó(v/p) from 0 to n with a final
payment of v/p.
B. Remarks
26Five remarks are in order about optimal remuneration wit'd worker myopia. First,
this solution is in agreement with the more general solutions found by Kuhn
(1986). Kuhn, however, did not discuss the extent to which remuneration schedules
give a surplus to workers above the market clearing level.
As a second remark, it is of interest to consider how the results are modified
if workers cannot borrow, have a discount rate 6 (not necessarilly equal to r),
and have an instantaneous concave utility function U(C) where C is consumption.
The more interesting case here is one in which workers live for a significant
period after retirement. If the post-retirement period is sufficiently long that
the use of a contingent pension (or retirement annuity) of value v/p imposes no
upward jump in consumption at retirement, then the optimal contract pays a con-
stant wage premium over the entire worklife plus a retirement annuity of suffi-
cient value to prevent shirking late in a workerts career. In such a case, the
workerts present discounted value of retirement consumption will be at least
vp.'4 The consideration of worker risk aversion does not alter the conclusion
that optimal labor contracts are nonmarket clearing when there is a shirking
problem and upfront bonds are not feasible.
As a third point, it is worth noting two numerical examples for our case of risk
neutral workers. Fixing w* at 1, if v.2, t5.1 per year, and p.2 per year (a
number which might be realistic in cases where shirking is hard to detect), the
optimal wage w will be 10 percent greater than the outside wage w" and the final
premium will be equal to one year's outside wages. Thus wages significantly in
excess of w* occur in this example. The probability of being caught shirking (or,
to be more precise, the probability of sufficient evidence of malfeasance having
been uncovered that the firm can take disciplinary action) in this example is
27rather low.If shirkers can be detected easily and also easily dismissed if de-
tected, wage premiums are not likely to be very large. Consider the same param-
eters (w"l, ó.l per year, v=.2) with a change in p so that worker has a .5 chance
of being dismissed for shirking in a month. Translating p into an annual basis,
one finds that the optimum wage w is 1.0024 and the retirement premium is .024.
So cases where detection is fairly probable over the course of a month result in
small premiums.
The preceding observation may help explain the nature of differences between
primary and secondary labor markets. Doeringer and Piore (1971) note that most
jobs can be classified into those which have close monitoring, rapid dismissal
for worker malfeasance and low wages and those with loose monitoring, slow dis-
missal for fault, and high wages. If jobs differ according to p, the technology
of monitoring, such a pattern is explained.15
As a fourth observation on the myopia wage paths, it is worth remarking that even
the smallest amount of myopia by workers (i.e. the smallest difference between ó
and r) leads to a determinate wage schedule.
Finally, we note that our model suggests that Lazear's (1979, 1981) upward sloping
wage schedules prior to retirement are not the direct result of implicit bonding
but instead must arise from an upward sloping w schedule and/or the absence of
reputation by firms and workers, so that both may cheat. In our model where w*
is constant and the threat of lost reputation prevents firms from cheating, the
wage schedule is flat until retirement.Beyond a lump sum payment at the re-
tirement date, an increasing wage schedule in our model does not occur as an in-
ducement to get workers not to cheat.
28VII. ENDOGENOUS MONITORING
Inthe previous models, workers have greater incentive to shirk early in their
careers than late in their careers because the trust funds placed at risk when
workers shirk grow with job tenure. Thus firms should know that the prevention
of shirking requires more intensive monitoring of workers early in their careers
than late in their careers. The previous assumption of an exogenous and constant
instantaneous probability of being caught shirking is therefore unrealistic. An
endogenous choice of monitoring intensity by firms would be quite likely to gen-
erate a probability of being caught shirking that declined with workers' job
tenure. The previous analysis has not answered whether such a pattern for p(t)
would alter the conclusion that primary sector firms will choose to paywage
premiums. This section deals with that essential question.It yields the con-
clusion that wage premiums will be paid in a model where firms optimally choose
monitoring intensity according to worker's life cycle pattern of temptations to
shirk.
This analysis of endogenous monitoring requires the specification of a monitoring
technology. The probability of detecting a shirker is assumed to be proportional
to monitoring expenditures (i.e. expenditures on shirking detection.) The op-
timal monitoring strategy turns out to involve monitoring a worker intensively
at the beginning of his or her career with the level of monitoring expenditures
declining with job tenure as his or her trust fund grows. A wage premium above
the market clearing level turns out to be optimal. The wage premium depends pos-
itively on the value of shirking and the costs of monitoring.
29We return to the analysis f the basic model of section III (constant e*, constant
w', and no discounting) with the single modification that the firm has a choice
over expenditures on shirking detection. The firm seeks to pick a remuneration
package and monitoring strategy to minimize unit labor costs.A compensation
package in this no myopia case consists of a level of total payments made to the
worker at the end of his or her career contingent on the worker having never been
caught shirking. A monitoring strategy involves a choice of monitoring expendi-
tures and thereby a shirking detection probability at each point of time in a
worker's career.The probability of detecting a worker shirking in the small
interval t to t+dt, denoted p(t) dt, is proportional to expenditures made in
monitoring the worker over the intervaL This implies the monitoring costs over
the interval t to t+dt required to generate a shirking detection probability p(t)
dt are equal to cp(t) dt where c is a constant.
The problem for the firm is to pick a wage premium x over the market clearing
package to be paid at the end of the workers career and a level of monitoring
expenditures at each date. The choice of a level of monitoring expenditures at
each date is equivalent to a choice of the path for p(t). If the firm finds it
optimal at some date not to spend enough on monitoring to prevent the worker from
shirking, then the firm will set monitoring expenditures to 0 at that date. The
firm's problem is to choose x and the path of p(t) to minimize
In
(12) (l/(n-T))[x + wn + Jcp(t)dt]
T
The term in brackets in (12) is the sum of compensation costs (x+wn) and moni-
in
toring costs (jcp(t)dt). T is thedateat which the worker's trust fund is just
T
30large enough that he or she is on the mrrgin between working and shirking. If T
is greater than 0, then p(t) equals 0 for tlessthan T.
The problem is simplified by noting that the no shirking condition at date tis
given by
(13) p(t) dt(tw* +x)=vdt
where tw*+x is the trust fund accumulated up to t.Thisno shirking condition
implies a time pattern for p(t):
(14) p(t) v/(tw*+x).
Thus once the no shirking condition holds, monitoring intensity and the likelihood
of shirking detection declines over the course of a worker's career as the temp-
tation to shirk (v/[tw+x]) falls.
The substitution of the no shirking condition (14) into (12) and integration






The solution of the firm's problem involves minimizing C(x,T) with respect to x
and T. Consideration of the function shows an optimum of T0 with a premium x>0.
(The argument is just a bit complicated. Substituting the first order condition
for x into the first order condition for T shows that C/T>O. With T=O, 3C/3x<O
for x0.)
The analysis of this endogenous monitoring model has also been extended to the
case of a positive discount rate which is common to both workers and firms. The
derivations are quite messy and do not lead to an expression for C/3T that can
31be signed analytically. We have numerically determi ed the optimal solution for
a wide variety of choices of the parameters v, c, n, and the discount rate r. In
each case analyzed, the optimal solution involved T0 (theno shirking constraint
holding at all points of time) and a positive wage premium above nw.
Remark:
Since monitoring and close supervision of workers are costly, firms should make
workers post very large bonds and spend little or nothing on monitoring. The fact
that firms do devote considerable resources to monitoring employees for the pur-
pose of controlling worker malfeasance is direct evidence that bonding is limited
and that it is costly on the margin.
16
Thus it should not be surprising in a world
where the monitoring of workers accounts for a substantial portion of labor costs
that firms also utilize efficiency wages to provide incentives for adequate em-
ployee performance.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that the bonding critique justifies no a priori presumption
of an absence of efficiency wage premiums. Explicit upfront bonds are only rarely
observed. In the absence of such bonds, upward sloping wage profiles do not act
as a perfect substitute in providing incentives not to shirk. On the contrary,
in the absence of such explicit bonds, our paper suggests that second best optimal
remuneration schedules will be in excess of market clearing where shirking is a
potential problem and monitoring is difficult. The existence or nonexistence of
32an imp'-rtant role for efficiency wages is essentially an empiricil, not a the-
oretical problem.
The findings of this paper suggest the need for empirical work on the importance
of efficiency wages. First, research is needed to document the existence or the
nonexistence of sizeable and persistent wage premiums above the market clearing
level to see if the existing wage structure is compatible with the predictions
of a textbook competitive labor market model. If wages differ substantially from
those that can be reasonably justified by the standard competitive model, do they
systematically differ in the ways predicted by efficiency wage theory? Recent
work by Dickens and Katz (l986a,b) and Krueger and Summers (l986a,b) has demon-
strated the existence of substantial, persistent interindustry wage differentials
for "similar" workers (i.e. those that are "observationally equivalent" to the
econometrician).17 If there is a distribution ofwages for similar workers, some
workers must be earning wage premiums.
There remains the question of stigma and the importance of worker reputations on
labor market outcomes. Is the stigma from dismissal for cause from a job a suf-
ficient discipline device that wage premiums are not necessary? The importance
of such stigma constitutes an important question for future empirical research.
33FOOTNOTES
1.Models of this type have recently been examined by Bowles (1985), Bulow and
Summers (1986), Calvo (1985), Eaton and White (1983), Foster and Wan (1984),
Gintis and Ishikawa (1983), Jones (1985), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and Stoft
(1982). Stiglitz (1984) and Yellen (1984) provide excellent surveys of alternative
efficiency wage models of unemployment. Katz (1986) surveys recent theoretical
developments and empirical work related to efficiency wage models.
2. Furthermore, it has been noted by Carmichael (1985) that this property does
not depend on workers' ownership of assets if workers are sufficiently risk averse
or access to financial markets: the amount of the bond will be bid up in equi-
librium to the point where the marginal worker is indifferent between taking a
job, which pays a wage but requires an initial payment to the firm by the worker,
and being unemployed. No unemployed worker would prefer to work at the prevailing
wage and posting the bond for employment; capital market imperfections cause the
required bonds to be small, but will not cause the nonclearance of the labor
market.So unemployment is voluntary in this case.If, however, workers are
close to risk neutral, and have very limited access to capital markets, putting
at risk the small amount of bond they are willing to offer may not be enough to
induce them not to shirk. The generality of Carmichael's point depends on in-
stantaneous utility going to -ifworkers pay a firm a bond of all their "liquid"
assets.
3. MacLeod and Malcomson (1986) make a somewhat different assumption within the
context of a shirking model. They assume that firms can observe shirking but that
shirking is not public information in the sense that firms have a hard time
proving that a worker has shirked to a third-party such as a court or arbitrator.
This reflects the European tradition of requiring just cause for dismissal. Re-
cent court interpretations and legislation in several states suggest the United
States is moving in this direction away from a strict employment-at-will doctrine.
Still, the examples cited in the text indicate that the actual unobservability
of worker malfeasance by employers may be important regardless of whether observed
shirking is public information or not.
4. See Carmichael (1985) for an argument why involuntary unemployment may not
result even when firms cannot be trusted not to falsely default and Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1985) for several objections to his argument.
5. See Lazear (1981) for an emphatic statement of this point.
6. This folk argument is asserted in discussions of the bonding critique of ef-
ficiency wage models in Akerlof and Yellen (1984) and Yellen (1984) as well as
implied in many other papers and in many discussions at conferences which we have
attended.
7. This holds provided shirkers must be fired when caught rather than at a later
date. The reasons for and the implications of this assumption are discussed in
footnote 9 below.
348. Market clearing wages may provide sufficient incentive to prevent workers from
shirking throughout their careers if there are substantial costs associated with
the stigma of being fired for shirking or if their are substantial costs to moving
across jobs.
9. This assumption is plausible if the detection of shirking by the firm is ob-
servable to the worker, since the worker would continue shirking or quit if he
or she knew that he or she would get sacked before receiving deferred payments.
Alternatively, the delayed informing of the worker that he or she has been caught
shirking and in danger of disciplinary action is likely to leave a firm open to
an unjust dismissal suit for violation of the covenant of good faith in many
states in the United States and would not be permissible under the dismissal rules
in most European economies.
10. We assume that firms' production functions are of the form f(e*n) where n is
the number of laborers who are supplying effort e*. A worker who supplies 0 labor
has no effect on output. It is said that a worker who shirks supplies 0 units of
effective labor while a worker who works supplies e* units of effective labor.
11. If the firm could hide its knowledge of having detected a worker shirking and
wait till n before dismissing a worker for a shirking offense committed at t, the
worker's potential loss from shirking at t is instead
p dt (wn+x)
since a worker dismissed an n will attain no outside earnings. In this case, the
firm's optimal strategy is to hide its knowledge of having caught a worker
shirking and wait till just prior to till just prior to the worker's retirement
date to fire the worker.If the worker knows that he or she has been caught
shirking this strategy has no use. At that point, the worker will seek other
employment. Also, such behavior by firms may leave them open to unjust dismissal
suits or union grievances (see footnote 9).
12. Hutchens (1986) shows in a shirking model in which workers are assumed to be
able to post upfront bonds that the specter of firm cheating on delayed payments
introduces a form of fixed costs into the employment relationship. Since a firm
entails these fixed costs each time it hires a new worker, firms prefer to hire
young workers with long potential tenures. Hutchens argues that firms with rep-
utations for honesty do not face these fixed costs and should be indifferent be-
tween hiring young and old workers. In contrast, our model with limits to upfront
bonding shows that even honest firms face the fixed costs of generating enough
surplus to provide work incentives.If upfront bonds are limited, firms will
prefer to hire young workers so that the fixed premium required to induce workers
not to cheat is amortized over the longest period possible. This preference for
workers with long potential careers follows whether or not firms may potentially
cheat on their deferred payments to workers.
13. Evaluation of the integrals in (10) and a little algebra directly generate
the inequality
(n/T)(e_eT)) >e"-i.
This can be weakened to
e_2eT)+l >0.
This inequality produces the inequality noted in the text since
35e_2eT)+l ￿ >.
14.Thereis a second case where payments of value v/p at retirement severely
distort a worker's consumption profile.For example, it would entail a large
upward blip in consumption during the retirement period if workers live for only
a short time after the retirement date. Such a jump in consumption is quite costly
to risk averse workers. If risk aversion is strong enough and the losses from
shirking are small enough, it may pay the firm to spread out the payment of the
surplus v/p over a discrete interval immediately before the retirement date rather
than paying it as a lump sum at retirement. This type of contract will induce
workers to shirk very late in their careers.Still, the reduction in total
worklife payments may be large enough to offset the losses from shirking by
workers close to retirement.
15. This observation is the basis for formal models of dual labor markets devel-
oped by Bulow and Summers (1986) and Jones (1985).
16. See Dickens, Katz, and Lang (1986) and Carmichael (1986) for more detailed
discussions of this point.
17. See Summers (1986) for a discussion of some of the key conceptual issues in
trying to identify efficiency wage premiums.
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39APPENDIX 1
PROOFTHAT PAYMENT OF PREMIUM (v/p)e AT TIMEn
RESULTS IN LOWER UNIT LABOR COSTS THAN PAYMENT OF NO PREMIUM
(WITH CONSTANT w AND e* AND DISCOUNTING AT RATE r)
The proof follows by deriving the exact formula for T. The worker can view the
deferment of his payment until n in the market clearing case as the buildingup
of a trust fund whose value at time t, with discounted payments exactly matching
those in the secondary sector, is given by
fT
(Al-i) J ertiw di.
And the worker is just indifferent between working and shirking at time T where
the expected loss from shirking, which is
(Al-2) p dt JeT_t)w* di
is equal to the gain from shirking, which is v dt.In other words, the time at
which the worker ceases to shirk is the time when the accumulated value of the
trust fund to be forfeited if caught shirking has just reached v/p. Thus, T sat—
i sfi es
(Ai-3) w*'er(Tt) dt =v/p.












andalgebraic manipulation of (7) shows that this key inequality will hold if and
only if the following inequality holds:
(Ai-6) J ertdt -J ertdt -( Jertdt)e
rT
<o.
Evaluation of the three integrals in (Ai—6) shows the RHS to be(A1-7) [e/r] (eT_l),
sothe inequality (A1—7) and hence inequality (7) always hold. With discounting,
as without discounting, the firm pays less per discounted efficiency unit of labor
if it pays a premium above the wages in the secondary labor market.APPENDIX 2
PROOF THAT NONMARKET CLEARING WAGES ARE OPTIMAL IN THE CASE OF
ENDOGENOIJS LEARNING AND DISCOUNTING
The marginalno shirking condition is given by
(A2-1) p dt JTe_rtw*dt =v dt.
IfO and r>O, we know that
Jew dt J e w dt +v/p
(A2-2) o >o__________________
J etetl)dtJ e edt
since we proved in Appendix 1 that in this case the payment of a premium of v/p
leads to cheaper labor than the market clearing package.The RHS of (A2—2) is
average discounted labor costs at market clearing wages.The LHS of (A2—2) is
average discounted labor costs paying the premium v/p.So the question becomes
one of showing that
(D/B) >0
where0 J_rte(t_T)dt and B =Jertetdt.
Evaluation of the integrals D and B and taking the derivative of (0/B) withre-
spect toshows it to be proportional to
f(y) =(1-a)e-e +
witha positive constant of proportionality and where y=n(—r) and a(n—T)/n.
We analyze f(y) in two cases.
Case I: y>0 (>r)Taking srccessive derivatives of y, one finds that the Taylor's expanion of f(y)
around yO is given by
f(y) ((l_a)(l÷a)ml+am)ym/m!
m=2
— rm1m m m —L . 1m-j) —m-j+1J IJ _ m=2 j1 m
Eachterm in square brackets in the above expression is positive. Higher ordered
terms of a3 are negative, while lower ordered terms are positive with equal co-
efficients. The symmetry of the binomial expansion allows higher order and lower
orderterms in atobe matched up in such a manner that each term in square
brackets is easily demonstrated to be positive. Thus, f(y)>O for y>O.
Case II: y<O (<r)
It remains to show that f(y) is positive for y between —and0.This can be
accomplished by first considering the function g(z) where
(1+a) a g(z)=(1—cz)z
—z + az
andz=e'. Showing g(z)>O for O<z<1 is equivalent to showing f(y)>0 for y<0. One
can easily show that g(1)=0, g'(l)=O, g"(l)>O, g(0)0, and that g(z) approaches
O from above as z-0. An evaluation of g"(z) shows that g has only one inflection
point between 0 and 1. With only one inflection point in the range 0 to 1, the
properties of g noted above imply g cannot have a root between 0 and 1.g is
greater than 0 for z>0 and z<1. If g is ever less than 0 for z between 0 and 1
it must at some point fall below 0.If g falls below 0 in this interval it must
have an interior local minimum as well as two interior local maxima. This cannot
occur with only one inflection point. Since g has no roots between 0 and 1, f(y)
is positive for y<O.The proof that the p:yment of a premium of discounted value v/p dominates the
market clearing contract in the case of r>O follows directly from a comparison
of the average unit labor costs in each case and some tedious algebraic manipu-
lation.APPENDIX 3
DERIVATION OF MINIMUM COST COMPENSATION PACKAGE WITH WORKER
WORKER MYOPIA
Inthis appendix, we show that if a firm makes workers a final payment of v/p at
the retirement date n, the wage package which has the lowest present discounted
value to the firm and which prevents shirking throughout a worker's career will
be the payment of wages at constant rate w*+ó(v/p) fron 0 to n.




subject to the no shirking constraint at each point in time, which is
+e t)v/p ￿vip.
Define in canonical notation the variable x, where
x =Jtetdt.
• -t5t Then x —ew(t)
and the firm wishes to maximize
e (6tdt
subject to the constraint x(t)￿f(t)
where f(t) {(w*/ó) +(v/p)](ete).









Hence the optimal payments schedule which prevents the worker fromshirking from
oton and makes the final fixed payment v/p is
w(t) w +ó(v/p).
for t from 0 to n.